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The current economic crisis in Argentina is only  ity is going to allow for an adequate labor
partly the result of inappropriate domestic  market response, certain institutional changes
policies to cope with recent extemal shocks.  are necessary - including the decentralization
Years of inappropriate policies have damaged  of wage bargaining and the elimination of
Argentina's economy. Even if no extemal  traditional wage policies and general govem-
shocks had occurred, the country would still  ment intervention.
have  to change  the structure  of production.
* If resources are to be shifted among regions
Argentina has had trouble sustaining a  and industries, rigidities and restrictions on labor
program of structural adjustment.  Its experi-  mobility must be eliminated.  More labor
ences provide policymakers with some lessons  mobility means less pervasive govemment inter-
in designing a sustainable program to achieve  vention in the form of restrictive regulations and
price stability and change the incentive system:  spending pattems.  It also means that the govem-
ment must stop the use of deliberate policies of
Macroeconomic and trade policies must be  employment absorption.
consistent.  Trade policy in particular must mesh
with fiscal reforms, because cuts in public  *  Prospective losers in adjustment programs
spending exert downward pressure on the real  can stop their implementation, so it is important
exchange rate.  that adjustment programs provide them with
benefits. Public spending must be profoundly
Labor relations and labor market institu-  changed to reduce social costs during the
tions must be changed.  If resources are to shift  transition period. This will require extemal
among industries and regions and wage flexibil-  financing and debt alleviation.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Poor  growth  and  macroeconomic  imbalances  have  characterized
Argentina's  recent  history. In  combination  with long  run  stagnation,  the
country  has suffered  chronic  high  inflation  and  deep  cyclical  fluctuations
compounded  by intractable  balance  of payment  crises. Attempts  to stabilize
the  economy  and  achieve  a structural  adjustment  to restore  sustained  growth
and  basic  balances  have failed  due  to  both  a fragile  political  climate  and
inconsistent  policies. The lack  of  adjustment  has  been  partly  due  to
anticipated  negative  short  run  labor  market  outcomes  and,  in turn,  the
existence  of persistent  economic  imbalances  over  the  long  run  has  negatively
affected  wages,  employment  and  the  income  distribution.  This  vicious  circle
transforms  labor  markets  in the  Argentinean  economy  into  a crucial  factor
regarding  both  the  need for  and  the  feasibility  of any  significant  macro
reform.
This  paper  analyzes  the  performance  of Argentina's  labor  markets  in
recent  years. It aims  at  pointing  out  both  the  form  in  which  labor  market
outcomes  have  been  affected  by a  poor  economic  performance  and  the  form  in
which  reform  efforts  have  been  hindered  by anticipated  short  run  costs. We
begin  by  providing  economic  background  on the  Argentine  economy,  particularly
in recent  years. In section  III  we discuss  the  structure  and trends  of labor
markets  and  their  connection  with long  term  economic  policies. In Section  IV
we analyze  the  role  of labor  markets  in  the  adjustment  process,  and  discuss
the long  run  stop-and-go  cycle  of real  wages  growth  prompted  by the  role  of
unions  and  government  intervention.  In section  V  we present  a summary  and
conclusions.2
II.  LONG RUN ECONOMIC  TRENDS AND SHORT RUN ADJUSTMENT  POLICIES
I1.1  Nacroeconouuic  Policies,  Economic  Organization  ard  Growth
Trade and macroeconomic policies followed  after the Great Depression
are crucial to explain Argentina's poor economic performance.  During 1860-
1929 an export-led growth strategy  was  followed,  which included almost-free
trade and appropriation of the benefits of trade according to the country's
c=p3rativa  advai"Lges.  After the Great Depression,  adoption of an import
substitution strategy was a key policy shift.  Post-1945 government policies
aimed at expanding domestic  markets through overvalued exchange rates and high
import tariffs, distorting the resource allocation and thwarting exports over
the long run.  Economic results of inward-oriented  policies  were deficient
relative to those seen under the export-led strategy (Table 1)
Table  1
Different Strategies and Growth
(Real  Growth in per capita GDP)






The entire period 1900-1987  1.0
Source: IEERAL Data Base.
Macroeconomic policies affecting variables like the share of goverrment
consumption, public debt and the money stock in total income, as well as
commercial (export  taxes and import  controls) and exchange rate policies,  were3
mostly  responsible  for  the  increase  in  the  effective  exchange  rate  for  imports
relative  to  that  for  exports. The  resulting  price  increase  of import  goods
relative  to exports  made import  substitution  activities  much  more attractive
for  investment  decisions,  thus  prompting  an inefficient  specialization  of
production. In addition,  macro  policies  als-i  affected  relative  prices  of
productive  factors,  thus  resulting  in  a distorted  capital/labor  mix in
production  affecting  sectoral  and  regional  resource  allocation. 1
The  Argentinean  economy  can  be divided  into  three  sectors:  a rural
and  two  urban  sectors  (Llach  & S&nchez,  1984). The  rura:  sector  is  a net
ey c:. -of *wage-goods (mainly  agricultural).  Therefore,  real  agricultural
wages  are  inversely  related  to the  incentives  to produce  exportable  goods  for
a given  exchange  rate. The  two  urban  sectors  are  net  importers. They  consist
of an import  substituting  sector  (which  under  the  prevailing  inward-oriented
strategy  is  both  a  marginal  exporter  and  a  net importer  of inputs  and  capital
goods),.  and  a sector  producing  non-tradables.
This  economic  structure  led  to  a trade  off  between  the  trade
balance  situation  and  the  prospects  for  domestic  growth. Long-term  economic
growth  crucially  required  a stable  and  high  real  exchange  rate. But  a  high
exchange  rate  implied  higher  food  prices  and  thus  lower  urban  real  wages.
Since  urban  real  wages  were a  key  variable  for  policy  makers,  there  was a
tendency  to  hold  down incentives  to export. Thus,  due  to the  implementation
of a deliberate  policy  of overvalued  exchange  rates--i.e.  a  policy  mix aimed
at  bearing  high  wages in  combination  with low  real  exchange  rates--  relative
prices  attained  two  simu  _neous  roles:  a  mechanism  for  resource  allocation4
and  a distributive  device. This  led  to  contradictory  long  run  economic
targets:  inefficient  organization  of production  or improved  well-being  of
urban  workers,  a  conflict  generally  resolved  in  favor  of the  former.
As a  result  of  the  deliberate  policy  of  overvalued  exchange  rates,
Argentine'r  economic  history  during  recent  decades  can  be described  as a
series  of redistributive  periods  (domestic  currency  overvaluation  as  well as
increased  activity  and reai  wpges)  followed  by  periods  of stabilization
(devaluation  and  reductions  in the  levels  of activity  and  real  wages).
1I.2  Political  and Economic  Developments  of  the  1970s
Argentina  experienced  crucial  political  and  economic  changes  in  the
second  half  of the  19709. tDusually  high  growth  rates  of per  capita  GDP  at  an
average  of 3.9  percent  p.a.  had  been  observed  in  1963-73. However,  growth  did
not  result  from  specific  domestic  policies,  but  fror  favorable  foreign  terms
of trade  (FTT),  especially  at the  beginning  (1964-66)  and  the  end (1971-73)  of
that  period. Nonetheless,  economic  growth  allowed  for  policies  aimed  at
overvaluing  the  real  exchange  rate  and  at increasing  both  the  domestic
absorption  of goods  and  real  wages (Table  2 and  figure  1).  A new government
(Peronist)  that  took  over  in  1973  inherited  the  combination  of a satisfactory
economic  performance  with persistent  imbalances  associated  with the  structural
organization  of the  economy.
The  FTT  were  changing  still  favorably  in 1973-74  and  the  government
continued  using  redistributionist  policies. Achievement  of increasing  real
per  capita  GDP  and  real  wages  at the  cost  of a deteriorating  real  exchange
rates  was still  feasible. However,  the  hike  in  oil  prices  and the  ensuing
global  recession  revealed  the  fragility  of this  policy. Imported  inflation5
and  a sharp  decline  in  FTT  in 1975  made it impossible  to  maintain  the
overvaluation  of the  domestic  currency  without  creating  a sharp  external
deficit. When the  Peronist  administration  was  overthrown  by the  military  in
1976,  there  was an acute  balance  of  payments  crisis  and  a huge fiscal  deficit
of  more than  13 percent  of GDP.
Table  2
Argentina%  Economic  Indicators
(Index,  1970  - 100)
FTT  RER  GDP pc  w
1962  94  125  78  83
1963  101  120  75  81
1964  115  100  81  92
1965  114  95  87  98
1966  112  90  87  98
1967  107  112  88  96
1968  106  106  90  91
1969  101  103  96  96
1970  100  100  100  100
1971  114  94  103  104
1972  125  109  105  98
1973  142  88  109  107
1974  114  82  114  120
1975  95  82  111  115
1976  90  117  109  74
1977  94  105  114  69
1978  92  80  107  72
1979  100  58  113  80
1980  117  46  113  93
1981  125  57  104  85
1982  105  100  97  74
1983  102  123  98  90
1984  111  107  99  99
1985  95  133  93  81
1986  81  106  96  76
1987  77  107  97  67
FTT-  Price  of Exports  relative  to Imports;  RER-  Real  exchange  rate  estimated
according  to the  purchasing  power  parity  definition  (nominal  exchange  rate
adjusted  for  changes  in  domestic  and  foreign  prices)  GDP  pc-per  capita  GDP;
w-Real  wages (nominal  wages  deflated  by the  CPI).
Source:  IEERAL  Data  Base.6
Figure  1
FTT,  RIR,  GDPpc and  Real  Wages
(Index,  1970  - 100)
l.a.  Real  Wage and  Gross  Domestic  Product
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The  military  government's  objective  was to reduce  drastically
inflation  and  to initiate  a  longer  term  strategy  of switching  expenditures  and
productive  resources  to encourage  gust:ained  growth  and  full  employment.  A
central  part  of that  strategy  w&  a two-stage  trade  reform  in 1976-81. During
the  first  stage  (1976-1978),  an  unannounced  tariff  cut  was implemented,  along
with elimination  of export  t&zes,  and  placement  of  quotas  by tariffs  in  the
cases  of ali  commcdities  excepr  steel  and  aluminum. During  Lhe  second  stage
(1979-81)  a  preannounced  schedule  of quarterly  tariff  reductions  was achieved.
Even  though  the  program  was  supposed  tD  have  continued  until  January  1984,
trade  reforms  were reversed  in  1981  due  1J  - sharp  balance  of payments  crisis.
Completion  of the  trade  liberalization  was  jeopardized  by excessive
gradualism  in  the  second  stage  and  also  because  a  uniform  tariff  was not  the
end  target.  Strikingly,  the  final  result  on  overall  nominal  protection  --
including  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  --  was  contradictoryt  in 1979-80  the
unweighted  average  nominal  tariff  rate  decreased  slightly  (from  51.9  to 49.2
percent),  but its  dispersion  increased  greatly. 2
Another  problem  with  the  trade  liberalization  program  was the  use  of
an accompanying  inconsistent  mix  of fiscal/monetary  and  exchange  rate
policies.  In 1979  and  1980  use  of an  active-crawl-reduction  scheme  based  on a
preannounced  schedule  of future  devaluations  resulted  in  an especially  severe
currency  overvaluation.  Although  tax  collection  increased,  the  fiscal  policy
produced  a large  budget  deficit  because  of the  increase  in  both  current
spending  and  public  investment.  Thus  overall  deficit  went  up from  13 percent
of  GDP in  1976  to 16  percent  in  1981  and  17 percent  in 1982.  Since  a basic  aim
of the  macro  policy  was to curb  inflation,  the  government  reduced  the  monetary
financing  of the  deficit  and  it  began  to rely  heavily  on domestic  and  external8
borrowing,  thereby  pushing  up  market  interest  rates  and  significantly
increasing  the  public  external  debt. The  persistence  of a large  fiscal
deficit  in combination  with  a  severe  overvaluation  caused  pressures  towards
balance  of  payments  disequilibrium,  accompanied  by high real  interest  rates  as
well  as low  employment,  production  and  investment.
The  economic  policy  of the  late  1970s  did  not  produce  any  positive
result  in  terms  of  domestic  balances. Although  stabilization  r3duced  the
yearly  CPI  inflation  from  a  peak  of 441  percent  in 1976  to 101  percent  in
1980.  inflation  remained  high:  in  1981  it  was still  104  percent  p.a..
Likewise,  the  active-crawl  reduction  scheme  implemented  after  1978  and  the
external  financing  of the  government's  excess  demand  caused  the  real  exchange
rate  to  appreciate:  taking  1976  as a base  year,  its  level  was 39 in 1980  and
49 in 1981.
Financial  policies  used  after  1978  also  resulted  in  volatile  real
interest  rates. In  January  1979  the  preannouncement  of  nominal  devaluations
and  the  elimination  of  most  restrictions  on capital  mobility  were implemented.
During  the  first  eight  months  of 1979,  when the  policy  still  had  certain
credibility,  real  interest  rates  were low  but reached  negative  values  at
times. Later  on,  uncertainty  increased  and  risk  premiums  became  high,  thus
raising  real  interest  rates  as  high  as to 2 percent  per  month  at  the lower
end,  and  6  percent  at the  upper  end. The  increased  uncertainty  observed  in
1980-81  was  closely  related  to both  the  existing  gap  between  inflation  and  the
rate  of devaluation, 3 and  to  observed  change3  in  external  accounts  (Table  3).
The  long-term  structural  adjustment  program  was  barely  implemented
and  its  final  result  was  a shift  in incentives  in  favor  of nontradable
activities.  The short-term  stabilization  program  was  unsuccessful;  in the9
presence  of a persistent  budget  deficit,  financing  via  capital  markets  (which
replaced  simple  money  creation)  produced  a crowding-out  effect  and  was
strongly  deflationary  (Mann  & Sanchez,  1984,1985).  Table  2  also  shows  the
significant  variability  in real  output  between  1975  and  1980,  before  the
economy  moved  into  another  recession  in 1981,  which  exerted  pressures  on the
labor  market.
11.3.  The  Crisis  of  the  1980.
In 1981  new economic  authorities  had  to address  the  external  and
internal  imbalances  that  resulted  from  overvaluation  and  the  fiscal/monetary
mismanagement.  A  drastic  program  of exchange  rate  devaluations  was instituted
to deal  with the  most  urgent  policy  problem. From  1981  to 1983,  the real
exchange  rate  (RER)  depreciated  by 115  percent. 1981  and  1982  were  years  of
macroeconomic  adjustment  when the  RER  sharply  depreciated  and  both  the  real
per  capita  GDP  and  real  wages  experienced  large  reductions  (Table  2).  The
current  account  deficit  in  1982  was substantially  smaller  than  that  observed
in  1980  and  1981  (Table  3),  thus  probably  making  policy  makers  to  believe  that
further  adjustment  was  not  necessary. In fact,  they  opted  for  a new shift  in
policies  during  1983  and  1984.
Table  3
Selected  External  Accounts  - 1980/84
(millions  of  US dollars)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
Exports  8,021  9,143  7,623  7,838  8,100
Imports  10,540  9,430  5,336  4,505  4,600
Trade  balance  -2,519  - 287  2,286  3,331  3,500
Interest  payments  956  2,925  4,400  4,983  5,273
Current  Account
Balance  -4,769  -4,714  -2,357  -2,461  -2,492
Sources  D. Cavallo  (1986),  table  1.10
During  the  last  year  of the  military  government  in 1983,  the  policy
aimed  at recovering  real  wages,  thus  reinstating  the  traditional  deliberate
policy  of overvalued  exchange  rates. As a result,  real  wages  rose  22 percent
in 1983,  while  the  ratio  wage/exchange  rate  increased  more than  40  percent
during  the  last  three  quarters. The  overvaluation  was accompanied  by active
fiscal  policies  and  a resurgence  of inflation.  Long  term  adjustment  was
relinquished  and  traditional  populist  policies  returned  to guide  policy
making.
A civilian  government  (Radical  Party)  took  office  in  December  1983.
A very  weak  economic  situation  confronted  vast  expectations  on  better  social
welfare  resulting  from  the  restoration  of democratic  institutions.  Activity
levels  and  wages  continued  to  grow  in  1984  accompanied  by a high  fiscal
deficit,  growing  inflation,  low  public  utility  rates,  and  exchange  rate
overvaluation  (Table  2 shows  that  the  real  exchange  rate  declined  13  percent
between  1983  and  1984,  while  real  wages  increased  10  percent).
At the  end  of 1984  the  government  signed  an agreement  with the  IMF
which  initiated  an external  sector  adjustment  based  on  demand  reduction.
During  the  last  quarter  of 1984  and  the  first  half  of 1985  the  economy
suffered  a drop  in real  wages  and  activity  levels,  a depreciation  of the
exchange  rate,  and rising  inflation. In  June  1985,  after  sharp  increases  in
public  utility  rates  and  a drastic  devaluation,  the  Austral  Plan  was
introduced.  It contained  both  heterodox  and  orthodox  ingredients  to  deal  with
inflation. The  former  included  a  wage and  price  freeze  and  a deindexation  of
debts. The  latter  included  long-term  measures  such  as a  high  exchange  rate
and  fiscal  restraint.11
Inflation  declined  rapidly  in 1985  due  to  price  and  wage  controls.
However,  since  the  fiscal  problem  remained  unsolved,  monetary  policy  continued
to  be very  active. At first,  the  demand  for  money  increased  substantially,
but  inflation  returned  later  on  due  to expectations  on the  unsustainability  of
the  program. In  August  1986  and  February  1987  there  were two  other  attempts
to reduce  inflation  by  means  of a  tight  monetary  policy  and  control  on  wages
and  prices. However,  inflation  remained  high  because  its  primary  source  --
lack  of fiscal  discipline  --  was  not  eliminated.  In addition,  in  August  1986
a  period  of overvaluation  begans The  RER  averaged  113  (index  December
1976-100)  during  the  first  seven  months  of 1986  and  then  dropped  to 106  during
the  period  August  1986  to  August  1987.
II.4  A  Frustrated  Process  of  Adiustment  (1987  - 1988)
During  September  and  October  1987  the  government  began  to implement
some  new  policies  much  more in  line  with a  program  of structural  adjustment.
However,  no positive  result  has  been  yet  observed  and  no structural  adjustment
has  taken  place. The  relevant  question  is  as to  why a  government  politically
committed  to structural  adjustment  ended  up  with  quite  different  results. The
period  can  be divided  into  two  phases. During  the  first  one,  from  September
1987  to July  1988,  a devaluation  followed  by a  crawling  peg  adjustment  of the
exchange  rate  was implemented.  During  the  second  one,  after  July  1988,  the
real  exchange  rate  again  appreciated  importantly.
During  the  first  phase,  non-agricultural  wholesale  prices  experienced
very significant  increases  of 49  and  23.6  percent  with respect  to  private
services  and  the  cost  of living,  respectively.  Cereals  and  oilseed  prices
increased  84  percent  with respect  to  private  services  with  the  help of the12
increase  in international  grain  prices. During  this  phase,  the  exchange  rate
policy  provided  substantial  incentives  to the  tradable  sector  (Table  4).  As a
result,  export activities  expanded  and  a reallocation  of resources  towards
export-oriented  activities  began. The  effects  of this  policy  on the  volume  of
exports  and  the  trade  surplus  were significant.  Exports  increased  43.6
percent  and  the  trade  surplus  607  percent  in 1988. In the  specific  case  of
manufacturing  --  a potentially  exportable  sector  in  Argentina  --  the  change  in
relative  prices  (wages,  exchange  rate  and  domestic  terms  of trade)  led  to  a
pattern  of increasing  profits  and  remarkable  exports  growth.
Inflation  accelerated,  mainly  due  to the  failure  in reducing  the
fiscal  deficit. After  falling  from  25  percent  in  October  1987  to  3 percent  in
December,  the  monthly  inflation  rate  reached  more  than  20  percent  in  July
1988. At the  time  that  price  and  exchange  controls  were imposed  the
government  announced  long-term  measures  aiming  at shifting  resources  to
tradable  activities,  improving  the  x-efficiency  of  the  public  sector,  and
freeing-up  rigidities  in factor  and  output  markets.
During  the  second  phase,  --  after  July  1988  --  real  wages in
manufacturing  increased  and  profits  began  to decline  (Table  5).  Table  4 also
indicates  that  non-agricultural  wholesale  prices  (i.e.  mainly  manufacturing
prices)  deteriorated  vis-a-vis  private  services  (-0.5  percent),  the  cost  of
living  (-7.4  percent)  and  construction  (-4.2  percent).  In  other  words,  the
domestic  terms  of trade  turned  in  favor  of  non-tradables.  When  the  increase
in  wages  and  in  the  price  of non-tradables  is  accompanied  by overvaluation  and
elimination  of import  restrictions,  the  manufacturing  sector  probably  faces
falling  profit  margins  (the  squeeze  on tradables)  and  lower  domestic  market13
shares. The  poor  timing  and  lack  of coordination  between  short-term  and  long-
term  economic  policies  hindered  the  achievement  of structural  adjustment.
Table  4
Changes  in  Relative  Prices
(percentages)
Relative  Prices  June '85/  Aug '86/  Sept '87/  July '88/
Aug.'87  Aug '87  July '88  Oct '88
Exch.rate  /private  services  -40.1  -5.2  25.0  -12.7
Non-agric  WPI/irivate  services  -44.7  -8.9  49.0  -0.5
Non-agric  WPI/cost  of living  -32.8  -6.9  23.6  -7.4
Non-agric  WPI/cc.  struction  cost  -7.2  1.0  15.1  -4.2
Cereals-oilseeds/private  services  -37.6  11.0  84.0  -21.8
Source:  IEERAL  Data  Base.
Table  5
Manufacturing  Wage,  Exchange  Rate,  and  Product  Wage
Index,  1988/III  - 100
Wage/Exchange  Product-wage/
ratel  gains2
1987  III  121  125
IV  111  116
1988  I  114  125
II  109  109
III  100  100
IV  111  116
1.  Manufacturing  nominal  hourly  wage divided  into  the  excbtnge  rate  at
which  imports  are  traded.
2.  Ratio  of  wage cost  (ratio  between  the  nominal  hourly  wage  paid in
manufacturing  and  the  corresponding  wholesale  product  price)  to
productivity  (output  per  man-hour).
Source:  IEERAL  Data  Base.14
Figure  2
Real  Wage  and  Product  Wage  in  Manufacturing
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III.  T  STRUACT  NRE  AD  TRISIDS  OF  LABOR  MARKETS
113.1.  MaM  Trends
Observed  labor  market  results  are  paramount  in  analyzing  the  import-
substituting  policy  followed  by  Argentina. A wage setting  mechanism  based  on
a deliberate  policy  of overvalued  exchange  rates,  and  restricted  by the *trade
balance/  domestic  growth  trade-off,  was the  driving  force  of labor  markets.
The  basic  policy  tool  was government  intervention  supported  by urban-based
unions  and  political  groups. The  main  observed  outcomes  were  a  mild real
wages  growth  over  the  long  run,  large  short-run  economic  fluctuations  and
distorted  relative  wages  among  productive  sectors.
Between  1940  and  1985,  real  wages  neither  rose  nor fell  for  more
than  three  consecutive  years. In all  but  one  case (1969-1971),  periods  of
growth  in  real  wages  were followed  by periods  of sustained  decline. By 1985
real  wages  were  only  61 percent  higher  than  in  1940,  thus  implying  an average
yearly  growth  rate  slightly  higher  than  1  percent  (Sanchez,  1987;  Riveros,
1989). If the  shorter  period  1962-1987  is  considered,  the  evidence  more than
confirms  the  wage  deterioration  over  time (See  Table  2 and  figure  l.a):  after
a growth  period  in 1962-74,  real  wages  declined  much  more than  real  per  capita
GDP.  In addition,  the  magnitude  of short  term  fluctuations  increased. For
instance,  in  1962-74  real  wages  rose  at a  yearly  rate  of 3.1  percent,  to
subsequently  drop  at an even  higher  rate (-4.4  percent). Over  the  whole
period  1962-87,  real  wages  fell  by an average  of 0.8  percent  per  year.
The  growth  in real  per  capita  GDP seen  in  the  period  1962-1974  was
positively  associated  with  high  and  growing  FTT.  In the  context  of the
inward-oriented  growth  strategy,  this  made it  possible  to devalue  the  exchange
rate  at a pace  lower  than  inflation,  without  concurrently  causing  a balance  of16
payments  crisis. This  was the  usual  mechanism  used  to enlarge  domestic
markets,  and  therefore  to  increase  real  GDP  and  real  wages  in  the  short  run.
As  soon  as  FTT  growth  began  to decline,  as in 1973,  a balance  of payments
crisis  arose  making  unavoidable  a  devaluation  and  a decline  in  wages.  Thus,
in  the  context  of a deliberate  policy  of overvaluation,  FTT  can  be seen  as a
determinant  of the  RER (see  Figure  3).4
The  observed  trend  in  relative  wages  is  an outcome  of the  inward-
oriented  growth  strategy. Domestic  market-oriented  growth  required  relative
prices  favorable  to  urban  activities  and  high  purchasing  power  for  wage-
earners. Argentine  population  is  mostly  concentrated  in  a few  urban  centers,
while  services,  construction,  and import-substituting  industries  produce  and
sell  most  of their  output  in these  markets. Thus,  the  evolution  of relative
wages  from  the  1940s  to the  1980s  has  clearly  favored  labor  in  non-tradable
activities  (Sanchez,  1987;  Riveros,  1989). Moreover,  observed  wage  changes
did  not reflect  changes  in  labor  productivity  in  non-tradable  activities
(Sanchez,  1987)  and  did it  only  mildly  in  manufacturing.
Table  6 and  figure  4 show  the  evolution  of relative  wages  over  the
period,  1962-87. In order  to avoid  problems  of interpretation  associated  to
the  peculiar  behavior  of  public  sector  wages  after  1985 (sharp  wage cuts  due
to government  stabilization  programs),  they  are  not  included  in the  group  of
non-tradables.  Relative  wages  seemed  to change  in  favor  of tradable
activities  only  in 1984. Over  the  entire  period,  however,  the  stability  in
relative  wages is  notable,  probably  reflecting  more  government  intervention
than  a relatively  stable  average  labor  productivity.17
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Following  the  lines  of  the  overall  wage strategy,  the  wage
determination  system  has  been  a  crucial  determinant  of the  observed  stability
in relative  wages.  In fact,  collective  bargaining  takes  place  at  national
level  and  with significant  government  intervention.  Thus,  it  has  been
generally  simple  to  bias  the  results  in  favor  of political  clients,  and  to
promote  wage growth  regardless  of the  situation  of the  firms. Given  its
effects  on relative  wages,  this  wage  determination  system  has  also  been  a
source  of poor  inter-sectoral  labor  mobility  (Riveros,  1989).18
Table  6
The  Evolution  of  Relative  Wases  (1962-1987)
Year  VTIWU  WTIVW  Year  VTIWU  WPT/VN
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
1962  0.83  0.99  1974  0.93  1.05
1963  0.79  0.95  1975  0.92  1.02
1964  0.82  0.96  1976  0.93  1.04
1965  0.88  1.01  1977  0.94  1.04
1966  0.90  1.03  1978  0.91  1.01
1967  0.89  1.05  1979  0.93  1.04
1968  0.88  1.03  1980  0.89  0.99
1969  0.88  1.04  1981  0.91  1.03
1970  0.89  1.04  1982  0.91  1.03
1971  0.91  1.04  1983  0.95  1.05
1972  0.91  1.03  1984  0.96  1.10
1973  0.88  1.00  1985  0.97  1.10
1986  0.96  1.12
(1)  Wages  in  Tradable  Industries  to  Wages  in  Nontradable  industries.
Tradables  include  agriculture  and  manufacturing,  Non-tradables  include
construction  and  services  excluding  government.
(2)  Wages  in  Potentially  Tradable  industries  to  wages  in  Non-tradable
industries.  Potentially-tradables  include  manufacturing.  WN is  defined  as
in (1).
Source:  IEERAL Data  Base.
ri1.2  Regional  and  Sectoral  Labor  Allocation
Important  population  concentration  in  a few  urban  centers  is an
outcome  from  both  observed  trends  in  public  investment  and  social
expenditures,  as  well  as distorted  relative  output  prices  and  the  skilled-
unskilled  wage gap  among  regions  (which,  in  turn,  resulted  from  the
centralized  nature  of the  wage-setting  process). Although  population  growth
has  been traditionally  low  in  Argentina,  the  urban  population  has  grown  much
more rapidly,  and  rural  population  growth  rates  have  been  negative  for  many
years  (see  table  7).19
Figure  4
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Source:  IERRAL  Data  Base.
According  to 1980  figures,  the  urban  population  represented  83
percent  of the  total  population.  In 1988,  of  the  about  33  million  inhabitants
of the  country,  42  percent  lived  in  Greater  Buenos  Aires,  C6rdoba,  and
Rosario,  and  35  percent  in the  two  former  cities. This  pattern  of demogrsphic
concentration  is likely  a consequence  of the  deliberate  policy  of overvalued
exchange  rates,  (and  of the  accompanying  commercial  and  macroeconomic
policies)  which  affected  relative  prices  and  wages  and  biased  labor  allocation
against  tradables. Any increase  in  the  average  wage of the  urban  economy
(such  as government  mandated  across-the-board  increases,  or union  demands
leading  to similar  results)  increased  wages  in  non-tradable  sectors  more  than20
labor  productivitw.  Thus,  prices  in this  sector  had  to grow  at  a  higher  rate
relative  to that  of tradable  sectors  in  order  to  maintain  relative  wages  at
their  targeted  levels. The  final  outcome  was that  the  change  in relative
prices  necessary  to obtain  a  glven  increase  in the  average  wage  of the  urban
economy  increased  over  time.
Table  7
Average  Annual  Rate of Population  Growth
(percentages)
Census  Greater
Periods  Total Urban Rural  Buenos  Aires  Cordoba  Rosario
1914-1947  2.1  2.5  1.4  m.a.  m.a.  m.a.
1947-1960  1.8  2.8  - 0.5  6.1  3.6  2.4
1960-1970  1.6  2.5  - 1.4  3.8  3.0  2.0
1970-1980  1.8  2.6  -0.03  2.5  2.2  1.6
Source:  C. Stnchez  (1986)  tables  1  and  2.
In  addition  to the  bias  in  favor  of non-tradable  sectors  derived
from  aggregate  economic  policies  and  government  intervention  investment  in
education,  health,  housing,  transport,  communications  and  culture  was also
concentrated  in  urban  areas. This  allocative  pattern  was reinforced  by social
policies  which  were  characterized  by subsidies  that  instead  of supplement.ng
the income  of the  poor  regardless  of  where  they  lived,  provided  free-of-
charge  public  services  to  persons  living  in the  largest  cities,  regardless  of
their  income  (SAnchez,  1986,1987).
Legal  regulations  on nominal  wage setting  also  contributed  to the
concentration  of resources  in  urban  areas. Nominal  wages,  whether  determined
by legal  procedures  for  bargaining  or  established  by the  government  in  periods
when  union  activity  was prohibited,  were  compulsory  for  all  workers  and  firms.21
Therefore,  differences  in  the  relative  availability  of labor  in different
regions  did  not  affect  the  level  of  wages. At the  same  time,  this  wage policy
discriminated  against  small  firma  and  the  marginal  investor,  thus  also
restraining  the  creation  of  modern  activities  in areas  of the  country  apart
from  the  largest  cities  and  producing  a one-way  flow  of  migrants  from  regions
to  urban  centers.
This  latter  result  is consistent  with economic  theory. A
disaggregation  of labor  into  two  groups,  skilled  and  unskilled,  reveals  that
the  regions  have  excess  demand  for  the  former  and  excess  supply  of the  latter,
while  the  opposite  occurs  in  the  wealthiest  urban  areas. Wage  differentials
among  regions  should  move  accordingly  and  provoke  a flow  of skilled  workers
towards  the  regional  markets,  and  a flow  of  unskilled  workers  in  the  opposite
direction. For  this  to occur,  wage  differentials  would  have  to be
sufficiently  large  in order  to  compensate  for  the  cost  of  moving  in  either
direction. Thus,  labor  flows  did  not  occur  as  expected  because:  a)  Even
though  wage  drifts  existed,  they  were  not  large  enough  to fully  compensate  for
the  rate  of institutional  wage intervention  in  equalizing  wages  among  regions.
Therefore,  wage differentials  were lower  than  those  that  would  have  prevailed
in  a decentralized  and  more  competitive  wage-setting  process;  b) Welfare
policies  and  related  social  expenditures  increased  the  cost  of  moving  for  the
skilled,  and  reduced  it for  the  unskilled. If the  former  decided  to  move,
they  would  lose  the  relatively  inexpensive  or free-of-charge  provision  of
social  services  in  the  cities. But  unskilled  workers  did  not  have to  bear
such  a cost:  if  they  moved  they  would  have  been  able  to receive  larger
subsidies  in  urban  areas.22
The  resulting  sectorai  labor  allocation  was as  expected. The  share
of employment  in  commerce  and  services  in total  employment  was almost  50
percent  in 19t0  and  more than  50  percent  in 1980  (Table  8).  The  non-tradable
sector  accounted  for  69  percent  of all  the  new employment  created  between  1947
and 1980  (85  percent  in 1960-70  and  87 percent  in  1970-80). Finally,  the
share  of the  non-tradable  sector  in total  employment  was 64.1  percent  in  1980
compared  with 49.6  percent  in  1940.  In  contrast,  the  share  of agriculture  in
total  employment  declined  by more  than  half  during  1940-80,  from  27.1  to 12.9
percent,  and  the  share  of  manufacturing  declined  steadily  since  1947.
111.3  Labor Market Se2  entation and Increasina Informality
Economic  growth  resulted  in  a notable  employment  expansion  in
services  and  construction  relative  to that  in  tradable  sectors,  and  a higher
increase  in  non-wage  than  wage  employment  (Table  8).  Following  a standard
approach  to  analyzing  labor  markets  in  LDCs,  urban  employment  can  be
classified  into  the  broad  categories  of formal  and  informal. This
classification  depends  on the  existence  of  protection  (or  lack  of protection)
of certain  sectors  with regard  to  the  coverage  and  enforcement  of labor
regulations.  Thus,  formal  employment  corresponds  to the  public  sector  and  to
private  sector  firms  employing  five  or  more  persons. Informal  employment
corresponds  to  unorganized  private  sector  firms  employing  fewer  than  five
persons. Since  not  all  the  workers  in  the  second  category  earn  a "low"
income,  informal  employment  may  be further  classified  on the  basis  of income
levels:  those  earning  high incomes  due  to  advanced  skills,  high  capital
intensity  or  an oligopolistic  market  environment  are  classified  in  the 'quasi-23
formal sector. The  rest  having  low  incomes  are  classified  in the  informal
sector  (Sinchez,  Palmieri  &  Ferrero,  1981).
Table  8
Characteristics  of the  Sectoral  ZmDloyment
(percentages)
Sectoral  Distribution  Average  Employment  Growth  p.a.
Agri. Manu.  Total  Agri.  Maniu.  v  nw
N-T  w  nw  w  nw
1940  27.1 23.3  49.6  na  na  na  na  na  na
1947  26.1 27.2  46.7  0.1  na  7.2  na  3.8  na
1960  20.8 27.1  52.1  -1.6  1.3  1.2  2.2  1.9  3.6
1970  16.2 23.3  60.5  -0.6  -2.1  0.4  -3.6  2.6  2.8
1980  12.9 23.0  64.1  -0.9  -0.6  1.1  2.6  1.7  3.2
Agri-Agriculture;  Manu-Manufacturing;  Cons-Construction;  Comms-  Commerce;
N-T-  Non-Tradables;  w- wage  employment;  nw-  non-wage  employment.
Data  on sectoral  distribution  are  expressed  as  a proportion  of total
employment.
Source:  Taken  from  C. Sanchez  (1984),  table  8.
The  proportion  of  quasi-formal  and  informal  workers  in  Argentina--
which  is  equivalent  to  the  concept  of informal  sector  used  elsewhere  --  is  of
about  302  of the  urban  work force. Therefore,  in relation  to  other  Latin
American  countries  where  informality  accounts  for  40  percent  or  more  of the
labor  force,  informality  is  not  as important  in  urban  labor  markets  of
Argentina. Nonetheless,  given  that  formal  wages  are  protected  vis-a-vis  the
informal  sector  through  several  labor  regulations,  as  well as government  and
union  intervention,  adjustment  policies  have increased  the  formal-inforral
wage gap (Lopez  &  Riveros,  1989). This  result  is  associated  with the  presence
of a relatively  higher  wage rigidity  in  formal  activities  and  low  labor
mobility. In addition,  the  increase  in  the  formal-informal  wage gap  as a24
result  of a  typical  macroeconomic  adjustment  program;  probably  is  a negative
factor  affecting  its  political  sustainability.
Lack  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  has  probably  been  at the  root  of
relatively  high  income  levels  observed  in the  informal  sector,  which  is  mostly
a producer  of non-tradables.  For  example,  statistics  for  1984  and  1985  show
that  self-employed  workers  with less  than  8  years  of schooling  (a  reasonable
proxy  for  the  unskilled)  earned  incomes  that  were approximately  18  percent
higher  than  those  earned  by  wage-earners  with the  same  level  of education.
Indeed,  average  self-employed  income  was only  7  or 8  per-ant  less  than  the
national  average  wage. 5. However,  if one  uses  the  concept  of total  labor
costs,  to account  for  all  incomes  received  by  wage labor  in the  formal  sector,
a  different  conclusion  may  arise,  particularly  in  considering  that  in 1985
non-wage  labor  costs  (considering  fringe  benefits,  social  security  and  regular
bonuses)  were  about  51 percent  of total  wage  costs  (Riveros,  1989).
III.4  Labor  Market  Institutions
The  role  o' labor  market  institutions  is  important  in leading  to the
formal/informal  distinction  which  is,  in  turn,  a key  factor  with regard  to
the  labor  market  response  to  macro  policies. The  Argentinean  economy  is
characterized  by  politically  strong  oligopolistic  firms  producing  for
domestic  markets  that  have  created  powerful  protectionist  lobbies. Their
counterpart  is an  equally  powerful  labor  union  which  is organized  as
corporations,  whose  influence  on  government  policies  has  been  paramount.25
Although  some  changes  in  the  structure  of power  in  the  labor  movement  have
occurred  during  the  last  decade  in  Argentina,  unions  are  still  extensive,
disciplined,  and  politicized.
The  law  allows  workers  to freel.y  organize  unions. But in  order  to
obtain  the  legal  right  to bargain  with employers,  a credential  of 'trade-
union  representativeness'  (personeria  gremial)  is required. This is  granted
by the  government  to the  most important  union  (mainly  in terms  of membership)
in each  area  of activity,  although  exceptionally,  and  mostly  due  to  political
reasons,  trade  union  representativeness  has  been  granted  to  more than  one
union.
Even  though  the  right  of  a  worker  in  order  to  join  or  not to  join  a
union  is  protected  by the  law,  the  terms  of the  labor  contract  agreed  to by
the  representative  union  and  the  employer  are  compulsory  for  all  workers  in
the  activity. In turn,  unions  may  join  federations  and  confederations  which,
once  obtained  legal  representativeness  can  negotiate  wages  at a  very  aggregate
level. In this  manner,  wages  and  working  conditions  are  centrally  determined
by negotiation  between  national  unions  and  entrepreneurs,  process  also
characterized  by strong  government  intervention.  In  periods  when collective
bargaining  was not in  practice,  wages  have  also  been  centrally  determined  by
government  decrees  and  resolutions.
Job security  regulations  are  considered  an important  factor
hindering  interindustrial  labor  mobility. The law  states  the  right  of the
worker  to  keep  his job  regardless  of the  circumstances,  although  it does  not
establish  anything  about  income  maintenance.  The  law  also states  that  in  case
of dismissal,  a severance  payment  equal  to the  highest  monthly  wage or salary26
earned  by the  employee  in  his  current  job,  multiplied  by the  number  of years
worked  has  to  be paid.  However,  this  highest  wage  cannot  be  higher  than  three
times  the  legal  minimum  wage.
Mandated  minimum  wages  are  another  important  institution  exerting
several  effects  upon labor  market  outcomes. First,  they  set  a limit  for
severance  payments,  thus  affecting  the  normal  rate  of  job turnover. Second,
they  affect  prevailing  equilibrium  wages  due  to the  effect  of  minimum  wages  in
shifting  the  entire  wage structure  up (Paldam  & Riveros,  1988;  Sanchez  &
Giordano,  1988). Third,  given  the  positive  effect  of  minimum  wage changes  on
average  wage  changes,  the  former  are  also  related  to existing  inflationary
pressures  (Paldam  & Riveros,  1988). Fourth,  evidence  suggests  that  relatively
high  minimum  wages  positively  affect  the  formal-informal  wage  gap  and
negatively  the  employment  level  in formal  activities  (Sanchez  & Giordano,
1988;  Lopez  &  Riveros,  1989).6
IV.  THE  ROLE OF  LABOR HARKETS IN  THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
IV.l.  The  Performance  of  Labor  Markets  in  Adiustment
As discussed  above,  the  two  most recent  attempts  to introduce
structural  adjustments  in  Argentina  were unsuccessful.  Interactions  among
policies  and relative  prices  affecting  labor  markets  operation  can  be seen  in
Tables  2, 6,  and  9.  Despite  a series  of  nominal  devaluations,  the  wage-
exchange  rate  policy  mix followed  systematically  used  between  1962  and  1983
resulted  in  wage rigidity  and increasing  non-tradable  prices  relative  to the
price  of exportables.27
As discussed  earlier  in section  II,  there  has  been  a sequence  of
devaluation-recession  periods  followed  by periods  of  exchange  rate
appreciation.  During  the  latter,  wage indexation  normally  hindered  the
intended  adjustmeat  process  initiated  through  an usually  severe  devaluation.
Implementation  of the  deliberate  policy  of  overvalued  exchange  rates  increased
urban  prices  and  activity  levels  relative  to tradables,  affecting  mostly  rural
production.  Union  activity  and  minimum  wages,  were the  basic  driving  forces
used  for  the  maintenance  of  high  urban  wages. Real  wage increases  were
usually  attained  first  in the  manufacturing  sector  (where  unions  acted  as  the
leaders  of the  entire  urban  labor  movement),  and  then  propagated  to services
and  construction. 7
Nominal  devaluations  were always  the  final  outcome  of periods  of
policy-induced  urban  expansion. Both  the  length  and  the  intensity  of periods
of overvaluation  and  urban  expansion  were  highly  correlated  with observed
hikes  in  FTT (see,  for  example,  Figure  3). When the  FTT  were  at a low  level,
it  was not  possible  to  maintain  an overvaluation  anymore  without  causing  an
external  imbalance.  The strong  relationship  between  the  exchange  rate  policy
and relative  wages  can  be  more clearly  seen  in  the  following  averages,
estimated  from  tables  2  and  6 (Index  1962172  - 100).
Reform  period  Wt/Wn  Wn/Wn  RER
1973-1975-1976  105  101  83
1976-1980  106  101  80
1981-1983  106  103  92
1984-1987  113  111  112
Wts  wages in  agriculture  and  manufacturing.
Wn:  wages in  non-tradables.
RER:  real  exchange  rate.28
Table 9
Argentina:  lelatlve  Prices and GDP, 1962-87
Pu/Pt  Pu/Px  Pn(pm  W/e  Wh/Wh  GDP
1962  91  98  78  57  0.99  69
1963  89  92  78  58  0.95  67
1964  84  82  73  79  0.96  74
1965  87  92  72  90  1.01  81
1966  97  106  87  98  1.03  82
1967  98  106  90  78  1.05  84
1968  102  109  97  80  1.03  87
1969  103  110  100  90  1.03  95
1970  100  100  100  100  1.04  100
1971  96  89  99  114  1.04  105
1972  87  79  186  97  1.03  108
1973  95  88  99  149  1.00  115
1974  102  104  102  211  1.05  122
1975  108  138  95  219  1.02  121
1976  99  123  83  103  1.04  121
1977  101  111  94  114  1.04  128
1978  110  118  112  166  1.01  122
1979  111  114  116  289  1.04  131
1980  125  134  135  487  0.99  133
1981  127  150  131  391  1.03  125
1982  103  129  89  196  1.03  118
1983  101  127  85  199  1.05  121
1984  106  134  92  254  1.10  124
1985  113  164  95  174  1.10  118
1986  124  138  130  199  1.12  125
1987  126  137  138  177  1.17  127
Pu =urban  price, or price of goods and services produced by the import
substitution sector (manufacturing)  and the service (including  commerce) and
construction sectors;
Pt =price  of tradables, i.e.  price of goods produced by the exportable and by
the importable sectors;
P. -price of exportables, i.e. goods produced by the rural sector and by the
food and beverage sectors;
Pm -price of importables, i.e. the price of goods produced by the import
substitution sector and the price of imported goods;
Pn -price of non-tradables, i.e. the price of goods and services produced by
the service and construction sectors;
Wh -wages and salaries paid in the import substitution or home goods sector;
Wn -wages and salaries paid in the non-tradable sector.
e -nominal exchange rate.
Source: IEERAL Data Base.29
In spite  of the  structural  adjustment  program  announced  in 1976,  the
relatively  low  RER  prevailing  from  1973  to 1980  held the  ratio  of  wages  in
tradables  and  nontradables  practically  constant. This  suggests  that  the
effects  of the  wage-exchange  rate  policy  mix  were  more important  than  those  of
the  trade  liberalization  and  other  adjustment  measures  announced  in  mid-
1970s. Later  on,  the  1987  adjustment  program  resulted  in  an immediate
increase  in relative  prices  of  urban  tradables.  It  was  apriori  expected  that
in response  to this  change  in relative  prices  wages  in  non tradables  (W.)
would  have increased  relative  to  manufacturing  (Wh),  thus  creating  incentives
for  labor  reallocation.  As discussed  in  section  II,  this  did  not  happen  due
to a series  of policy  reversals.
The  conclusions  to be  drawn  from  these  two  adjustment  attempts
suggest  that  labor  markets  variables  achieved  a negative  role  regarding
expected  structural  changes. While  the  main  policy  target  was a change  in
relative  prices  of tradables  to  nontradables  to  allow  a shift  of the  economy
towards  production  for  external  markets,  a  wage indexation  mechanism  supported
by government  and  union  intervention  created  substantial  rigidities.  Since
such  a  mechanism  implies  an increase  in  the  relative  price  of urban  goods
relative  to  exportable  goods  --  and  in the  price  of  non-tradables  relative  to
importables  --  a loss  in  international  competitiveness  inevitably  resulted.
Likewise,  each  of these  adjustment  attempts  worsened  inflation,  the  resource
allocation  across  industries  and  the  poverty  situation.
IV.2.  Level  and  Composition  of  Aagregate  Employment
Traditionally,  Argentina  did  not  have  employment  problems  resulting
from  an excess  of labor  supply. The  situation  was traditionally  one  of labor30
scarcity,  especially  in the  least  skilled  segment  of the  labor  force  (Llach,
1978). Nevertheless,  urban  labor  markets  (specially  in  the  largest  cities)
experienced  successive  periods  of scarcity  as  well as  of relative  abundance  of
labor,  due  to fluctuations  in  domestic  and  foreign  immigration  to large  urban
centers,  and  in  high labor  force  participation. 8
A situation  of relative  labor  scarcity  in large  urban  centers  Was
seen  in the  second  half  of the  1970s. Migratory  flows  changed  after  1970
when the  largest  urban  markets  were  no longer  the  recipients  of large  number
of workers  in  search  of better  job  opportunities.  Rural-urban  migration
continued  in  the  second  half  of the  1970s  but from  rural  areas  of  each
province  to its  capital  city  as  the final  destination  (Sanchez,  1984,1986).
In addition,  a series  of institutional  and  economic  developments,  particularly
the  adjustment  program  implemented  from  1976  to 1981,  reinforced  the  falling
trend  observed  in  labor  force  participation:  the  real  wage  was probably  below
the  reservation  wage  of many  labor  market  participants  and  a considerable
number  of  women,  young  adults,  and  even  20-59  year  old  males  abandoned  the
labor  force.
The  period  from  the  early  1970s  to  the  early  1980s  not only
witnessed  declining  labor  force  participation  rates  and  employment  (table  10),
but  the  sectoral  allocation  of labor  tended  to  diminish  the  supply  of  wage
labor  to the  goods-producing  sectors. Workers  were transferring  to
construction  and service  activities  and  to  non-wage  occupations  thus  affecting
the  availability  of labor  in  the  industrial  sector  (see  table  8).  Although
relative  sectoral  wages  did  not  chow  a  well  defined  trend  (see  table  6),
employment  creation  in  manufacturing  and  agriculture  was poor.31
Due  to these  economic  trends,  and  to the  withdrawal  effect,  open
unemployment  was not  a significant  problem  in the  urban  labor  markets  until
the  early  19809. But  the  situation  has  been  changing  during  the  1980s  and  an
open  employment  problem  has arisen. It  was stated  above  that  labor  force
participationi  rates  moved  in the  same  direction  as  economic  activity  in  the
short-term,  but there  have  also  been  long  run  trends:  considering  the  period
from  1974  until  May  of 1988,  table  11 and  figure  5 show  that  participation
r&tes  decreased  through  1983,  while  open  unemployment  and  underemployment
remained  low  compared  to  their  historic  levels  (table  10).9 Labor  force
participation  has ircreased  over  the  last  five  years  despite  high  variability
in output  growth  and  the  recent  slowdown  in  activity  levels  (Table  11,  Fig.
5).  The  reason  is that  the  labor  force  response  to the  existing  labor  market
situation  is  now different  than  prevailing  until  the  late  19709. The
'discouraged  worker'  effect  was  predominant  in  those  years  as declines  in
employment  and real  wages  were accompanied  by  withdrawal  of people  from  the
labor  force  (including  migrants  from  nearby  countries).  Currently,  however,
the  dominant  effect  derives  from  the  loss  of family  income  and  shows  up in the
increase  in  the  net inflow  of secondary  workers  into  the  labor  market. Of
course,  if the  probabilities  of finding  a job  are  low  in the  case  of
experienced  workers  (for  example  males  of 20-59  years  of age),  they  are  even
lower  in the  case  of secondary  workers. The  result  in those  trends  has been
an increase  in  open  unemployment  and  underemployment  in association  with the
laddedm  worker  effect. 1032
table  10
AraentinatIndlcators  for  Main  Urban  Labor  Markets
LFP  L  U  LFP  L  U
1950  46  44  4.3  1968  44  42  5.3
1951  46  44  3.5  1969  44  42  4.4
1952  45  43  4.0  1970  44  42  5.0
1953  45  43  4.8  1971  43  41  5.9
1954  46  43  6.2  1972  42  40  6.7
1955  46  43  5.8  1973  41  39  5.5
1956  46  43  6.8  1974  40  39  3.9
1957  46  43  6.3  1975  40  39  3.2
1958  46  43  7.8  1976  39  38  4.7
1959  44  42  5.5  1977  39  38  3.2
1960  45  42  5.6  1978  39  38  3.0
1961  45  42  7.2  1979  39  38  2.2
1962  45  42  7.3  1980  39  38  2.5
1963  45  41  8.9  1981  39  37  4.7
1964  45  42  6.3  1982  39  37  4.9
1965  45  43  5.3  1983  38  36  4.4
1966  45  42  5.8  1984  38  36  4.2
1967  46  41  6.4  1985  39  36  5.6
LFP:  Labor  Force  Participation  expressed  as a percentage  of total  population.
L :  Employment  expressed  a  percentage  of the  economically  active  population.
U  :  Unemployment  as a percentage  of the  labor  force.
Source:  Taken  from  C. Sanchez  (1987).  1950-1962:  Computed  from  population  and
census  data.  Employment  data  were  taken  from  Llach  & Sanchez  (1984).
1963-1985:  Data from  the  PHS.33
Table  11
Labor  Partclipation  and  UnemPloyment
(Greater  Buenos  Aires,  20  capital  cities,  and  5  non-capital  cities)
Labor  Force  Open
Participation Unemployment Underemployment  Equivalent
Rate  Rate*  Rate*  Rate*
1974  40.4  4.2  5.0  6.7
1975  39.9  3.7  5.3  6.4
1976  39.3  4.8  5.3  7.5
1977  38.7  3.3  4.0  5.3
1978  38.9  3.3  4.7  5.7
1979  38.3  2.5  3.8  4.4
1980  38.4  2.5  5.2  5.1
1981  38.4  4.8  5.5  7.6
1982  38.3  5.3  6.6  8.6
1983  37.3  4.7  5.9  7.7
1984  37.9  4.6  5.7  7.4
1985  38.1  6.1  7.4  9.8
1986  38.9  5.2  7.3  8.9
1987  39.2  5.6  8.1  9.9
1988  39.4  6.1  7.9  10.1
*  As percentage  of the  economically  active  population
Source:  Permanent  Household  Survey  (PHS). See  definitions  in  endnote  no. 7.34
Figure  5
Labor Participation  and  lauivalent'  Une.loyment









IV.3.  Unemploment  and  the  Public  Sector
The  previous  analysis  suggests  that  construction  and  services  of low
productivity  are  characterized  by substantial  hidden  unemployment.  Another
sign  of  hidden  unemployment  are  observed  public  sector  employment  trends.In
fact,  estimates  made in  1985  indicate  that  total  public  sector  employment  was
2,009,000  people  representing  as  high  as 17.5  percent  of the  labor  force  and
25  percent  of all  wage-earners  (Table  12).
Table  12
Public  Sector  Dmloyment (1985)
Relative  Share  Cfl
Public
Total  Sector  Labor  Wage
(in  thousands)  employment  force  earners
National  Administration  605  30.1  5.3  7.5
Public  Enterprises  398  19.8  3.3  4.9
Local  Government  1006  50.1  8.9  12.6
Total  2009  100.0  17.5  25.0
Source:  Sanchez  &  Giordano,  Proyecto  Gobierno  Argentino/PNUDIOIT,
ARG/87/003  (1988).
Rapid  growth  of public  sector  employment  in  the  provinces  has  been
notable  in  Argentina.  Table  13 shows  that  public  employment  grew  by  more  than
40  percent  during  the  period  1960-1987.  Most  of this  growth  was associated  to
a  huge increase  in employment  in local  governments  (more  than  200  percent),
which  took  place  in  periods  when  unsuccessful  adjustment  programs  were
underway.  Thus,  at the  time  that  overall  adjustment  failed,  partly  as a
consequence  of labor  market  intervention  policies  and  the  implementation  of
the  wage-exchange  rat.3  policy  mix, resulting  low  employment  growth  demanded
active  job  creation  in  the  public  sector.36
In addition  to the  political  commitment  of  keeping  low  open
unemployment,  high employment  growth  in  local  governments  was associated  with
changing  migratory  patterns.  Domestic  migratory  flows  changed  after  1970  as
economic  incentives  to  move  to the  largest  cities  declined. Instead,
population  began  to flow  from  rural  areas  to the  capital  of the  provinces,
where  the  probability  of finding  employment  was  higher. Mostly  due  to the
resulting  demands  for  more  employment,  local  governments  started  active  job
creationl 1 , thus  also  being  char&cterized  by the  presence  of hidden
unemployment.
Another  problem  with public  employment  refers  to itu  internal
composition. In  1985,  about  20 percent  of publi_  employment  was in public
firms  (in  many  cases  with  very low  levels  of labor  productivity,  as in the
case  of railroads).  In contrast,  less  than  30 percent  is  employed  in areas
providing  services  like  health  and  education. Thus,  the  relative  amount  of
workers  in  purely  bureaucratic  activities  is  high,  possibly  demanding  a
thorough  public  sector  reform  program.
Table  13
Public  Sector  Employment  Growth;  1960-87
(Index,  1960=100)
-----------------------------------------------------..---- __----------------_
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1987
National  Administration  100.0  93.7  100.1 110.3  97.6 106.3  104.5
Public  Enterprises  100.0  81.1  76.6 101.4  73.9  80.5  79.1
Provincial  Governments  100.0 105.7  131.7  178.1 205.7 239.0  259.7
City  Governments  100.0 116.0  134.4  181.6 179.2 202.4  220.0
Total  100.0  94.4  103.2  129.2 122.0 136.9  141.7
Source:  1960/1985,  see  table  15
1987,  estimated  from  figures  published  in  El Cronista  Comercial,
April  27,  1988,  p. 15.37
IV.4  Womn.  Labor  Markets  and  Adlustmeat
A sustained  increase  in  the  rate  of female  labor  force  participation
has  been  observed  in  the  1980s. The  most  notable  increase  was observed  in
women  in  the  age  group  35-49. The  drop  in family  income  due  to the  economic
crisis  and  the  need  to compensate  for  the  associated  loss  in  welfare  is a
possible  explanation  for  the  higher  participation  of secondary  labor  force.
As in the  data  presented  below,  the  main sources  of employment  for
the  rising  female  labor  supply  were  nontradable  activities:
Sectoral  Composition  of Female  Employment  (2)
1960  1970  1980
Total  100  100  100
Tradable  32  25  21
Agriculture  5  4  3
Industry  27  21  18
Nontradable  68  75  79
Sources  Estimated  from  census  data.
Examination  of the  composition  of female  employment  reveals  a
concentration  in relatively  few  occupations.  In  general,  increasing  female
employment  has  concentrated  in  nontradables,  possibly  in  occupations  of low
productivity.  In 1970,  approximately  58  percent  of the  total  female
employment  was in  clerical  positions,  sales  and  other  services  (mostly
domestic  services). In 1980  this  figure  was 63  percent. As expected,  the
female  average  wage  was  much lower  than  the  male  wage:  according  to PHS
figures,  it  was approximately  56 percent  of the  male  wage.38
IV.5.  Income  Distribution  and  Povert,
Absence  of structural  adjustment  in  Argentina  has  been  associated
with an increasing  deterioration  in income  distribution.  This  deterioration
derives  from  poor  economic  growth  in turn  resulting  from  the  disarray  of
policies  that  have  produced  higher  relative  prices  of  non-tradables  and
protective  regulations  favoring  urban  workers  in  the  formal  sector.
Examination  of the  poverty  situation  by economic  sectors  is less
satisfactory  than  analyses  based  on geographic  or functional  characteristics
or the  formal/informal  sector  distinction.  Unfortunately,  however,  data
(Permanent  Household  Surveys:  PHS)  are  not  available  to study  the  latter
disaggregation.  In addition,  data  are  limited  to the  cities  of  C6rdoba  and
Buenos  Aires. 12
Finance,  a  nontradable  sector,  and  Industry,  a tradable  sector
enjoy  the  highest  income  levels  per  worker  (higher  than  average),  the  lowest
unemployment  rates  (lower  than  the  overall  rates  for  each  city),  and  the
lowest  levels  of poverty  (Table  14). Commerce,  Services  and  Construction,  all
nontradable,  not  only  reveal  relative  incomes  lower  than  the  other  two
sectors,  but  also  a significantly  higher  level  of  unemployment  and
underemployment.  The  result  is  a large  incidence  of  poverty  in  each  sector.
An important  characteristic  of  nontradable  sectors  as a  whole  are  incomes
slightly  lower  than  the  average,  high  unemployment  rates,  and  consequently  a
greater  than  average  incidence  of poverty. This  is  concordant  with  a  model  of
the  labor  market  where  the  informal  sector  is  mostly  a producer  of non-
tradables  and  an employer  of  unskilled  labor. If this  is  a  neoclassical  labor39
market,  a  succession  of failed  nominal  devaluations  combined  with  wage
rigidity  in  formal  activities  must  have  produced  low  incomes  in informal
activities  and  relatively  higher  unemployment.
Table  14
Unemploynent.  Sectoral  Income  Distribution  and  Poverty
Equivalent  X  of  Poor in
Relative  income Unemployment  Rate  2  Total  Employment
Sector  BUE  COR  BUE  COR  Poor  Indigents
Total  1.0  1.0  9.4  8.9  14.6  3.3
Finance  1.4  1.6  7.1  5.1  9.6  2.7
Industry  1.1  1.1  7.1  5.5  11.7  1.8
Commerce  1.0  1.0  11.7  11.1  13.0  4.3
Services  0.9  0.9  11.2  10.6  15.5  4.5
Construction  0.8  0.8  15.3  14.5  25.2  4.6
Tradables  1.1  1.1  7.1  5.5  11.6  1.6
Nontradables  0.9  0.9  10.2  10.0  15.6  4.3
Definitionst  BUE:  Greater  Buenos  Aires;  COR:  C6rdoba. Relative  income
includes  wages  and  the  income  of the  self-employed  for
C6rdoba,  and  only  wages  for  Buenos  Aires. Equivalent
unemployment  rates  see  endnote  9. t  of poor:  data  refer  only
to C6rdoba. The  steps  followed  to identify  the  poor  were:
a) Size  and  composition  of  each  household  were identified;
b) Each  pmember  of the  household  was  transformed  into  a
'standard  adult'  according  to  a calorie  intake  table  (see
IPA-INDEC,  1988);  c)  Average  per  capita  income  was  estimated
and  compared  with the  'poverty  line;  d) The  poverty  line  was
defined  as the  income  level  necessary  to  buy a  basic  basket
of food (IPA-INDEC,  1988)  and  to cover  other  basic  needs;  e)
Household  members  with  per  capita below  the  poverty  line
were classified  as  poor.  Indigent  are  those  with income
below  the  amount  required  to  buy  the  basic  basket  of food
only.
Source:  Own  estimates  based  on PHS  data:  October  1986  for  Cordoba,  and  April
1987  for  Buenos  Aires.
The  rising  poverty  in  Argentina  during  the  last  15  years  is  mostly  a
result  of failed  adjustment.  In  addition  to rigid  wages  and  distorted  labor
allocation,  open  unemployment  and  underemployment  have  been  growing  for  the
last  S  years. Young  males  and  females  in the  age  group  35-49  are  the  most40
significant  group  of secondary  workers  swelling  the  labor  supply  to the
informal  sector. Most likely,  this  surplus  labor  usually  takes  refuge  in
construction,  commerce,  and  services,  activities  which  have  very  low
productivity  rates  and  where  unemployment  and  poverty  are  higher.
At least  in the  short  and  medium  term,  any  adjustment  process  will
inevitably  increase  poverty  due  to  higher  transitional  unemployment  and  the
drop  in real  wages. Adjustment  will  also  imply  declining  public  sector
employment  an  wages,  as  well  as expenditure  reduction  in  current  social
welfare  programs. Until  now,  however,  Argentina  has  been  suffering  the  social
cost  of  not-adjusting  and  trying  to  keep  an inappropriate  productive  structure
combined  with intervention  in the  labor  market  and  use  of a deliberate  policy
of overvalued  exchange  rates.
IV.6  Political  Economy,  Labor  Markets  and  Adiustment
Hyperinflation  is  now forcing  the  government  to attempt  a thorough
adjustment  program,  that  includes  profound  changes  in  the  functioning  and
institutional  organization  of the  labor  and  goods  markets. Deregulation.
privatization,  reduction  in public  expenditures,  trade  liberalization,  a shift
of factors  of production  against  the  non-tradable  sector,  and  other  similar
actions  are  not  without  cost.  Therefore,  a set  of labor  market  policies  are
required  in order  to facilitate  an efficient  change  at a  minimum  cost.
Severe  difficulties  will  be faced  in  shifting  labor  among  sectors.
Reforms  in the  labor  market  should  be designed  to facilitate  the  movement  at
minimum  cost,  which  would  need  deregulation  policies. Therefore,  a set  of
policies  should  aim  at  decentralizing  collective  bargaining  and  the  structure
of labor  unions. Another  set  of  policies  should  aim  at  making  labor  contracts41
more flexible  in  order  to  attain  higher  labor  mobility  and  to implement
feasible  programs  designed  to  assist  the  unemployed.  Finally,  the  application
of  macroeconomic  policies  should  be done in  combination  with a  dismantling  of
labor  market  intervention,  which  is  probably  going  to  diminish  labor  market
segmentation  and increase  the  trickle  down  effect  of  growth.
The  program  of economic  reforms  needs  to  be sustainable  and
credible. In  Argentina,  those  conditions  require  strong  political  support  and
a  clear  commitment  on the  part  of  the  government.  In turn,  this  requires  a
clear  engagement  of  unions  with the  process  of economic  reforms,  or &
substantial  change  in traditional  political  attitudes  of  unions. This  is  not
going  to  be an easy  task  not  only  because  the  enormous  lags  that  may  be
involved  in  changing  institutions,  but  also  because  unions  are  aware  that
structural  adjustment  would  imply,  one  way or another,  a loss  in  their  power.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
Although  severe  difficulties  in implementing  and  sustaining  a
program  of structural  adjustment,  change  is  inevitable  in  Argentina.  The
current  economic  crisis  is  not  only  the  result  of inappropriate  domestic
policies  to  cope  with recent  external  shocks. Even  if  no external  shocks  had
occurred,  the  country  would  still  have  to face  the  urgent  need  to shift  the
structure  of production  in  appropriate  directions.  The  current  economic
crisis  is  a result  of  wrong  policies  applied  for  years  that  have  damaged  the
economy.
Frustrated  adjustment  experiences  provide  some  lessons  that  can
assist  policy  makers  in  designing  a sustainable  program  to  achieve  price
stability  and  to  change  the  system  of incentives.42
1. The  consistency  of  macroeconomic  and  trade  policies  has  to  be
ensured.  In  particular,  trade  policy  must  be  combine  with  fiscal  reforms
since  reducing  public  spending  would  exert  downward  pressures  on  the  real
exchange  rate.
2. The  importance  of  implementing  changes  in  labor  relations  and
labor  market  institutions  also  has  to  be  emphasized.  Institutional  changes,
such  as  the  decentralization  of  wage  bargaining  snd  the  elimination  of  both
wage  indexation  and  government  intervention  at  large,  are  necessary  if
resources  are  to  going  to  shift  among  sectors  and  regions.
3. Shifting  resources  among  regions  and  industries  requires
elimination  of  rigidities  and  restrictions  on  labor  mobility.  Restrictions
resulted  from  the  regional  allocation  of  public  investment  and  social  welfare
expenditures,  as  well  as  from  regulations  on  public  services  and  subsidized
urban  utilities.  Thus,  more  mobility  will  require  less  pervasive
intervention.
4. Another  important  lesson  from  the  past  is  that  the  prospective
losers  in  an  adjustment  program  may  have  sufficient  power  to  stop  its
implementation.  It  is  therefore  very  important  to  try  to  incorporate  these
losers  into  the  benefits  of  the  program.  In  addition  to  implementing  the
changes  in  policies  and  institutions  previously  mentioned,  a  profound
switching  of  public  expenditures  is  necessary  to  reduce  the  social  cost  of
transition  period.  This  will  require  external  financing  and  debt  alleviation.43
5.  In uuumary,  the  main lesson  from  the  past  is  that  the  nature  and
extent  of the  changes  require  a deep  reform  program  which  will probably  not  be
feasible  without  government  credibility  and  the  commitment  of all  concerned
groups. This  challenge  for  the  Argentine  economy  require  deep labor  market
reforms, and probably a  high transitional cost.44
NOTES
1.  See  Nogues  (1981),  Cavallo  &  Mundlak  (1982),  Cavallo  (1986),  Cavallo  &
Cottani  (1986),  Sanchez  (1987)  and  Cavallo  &  Domenech  (1988).
2.  The  standard  deviation  increased  from  28.6  to 39.3  percent  and  the
coefficient  of  variation  from  0.55  to 0.88  (Cavallo  and  Cottani,  1986).
3.  1980  quarterly  figures  show  that  inflation  was 17  percent  while  the  rate
of devaluation  was  only  6 percent.
4.  Cavallo  & Domenech  (1988)  have  modelled  the  behavior  of the  RER
dependirg  upon  the  FTT,  the  trade  policy  (taxes  on imports  and  exports),
the  income  level,  and  the  macroeconomic  policy.
5.  It  must  be noted  that  the  average  income  of the  self-employed  as a  whole
was  approximately  23  percent  higher  than  the  average  wage of the  economy
(Permanent  Household  Survey-  PHS). Evidence  obtained  from  the  PHS
indicates  that  the  relative  income  of the  average  self-employed  is
higher  than  that  of the  wage earner,  and  that  the  differential  tends  to
increase  when the  exchange  rate  lags  behind  wages.
6.  Workers  receiving  a  wage not  higher  than  1.5  times  the  legal  minimum
represented  in  1981-1982  less  than  20 percent  of the  labor  force.
However,  in  construction,  commerce  and  services  the  specific  proportion
varied  from  21 percent  to 28  percent. The  proportion  of  women,  27
percent,  was also  higher  than  that  of  men, 18  percent. See  Sanchez  and
Giordano  (1988),  table  6.  This  suggests  that  minimum  wages  are  more
binding  in  non-tradables  and  in informal  sector  activities.  This
probably  affect  prices  of non-tradables  and  spurs  illegal  methods  of
hiring  in formal  activities.
7.  Llach  (1987)  has  estimated  sectoral  productivity  figures  and  concluded
that  urban  sector  development  is  based  much  more  on agricultural
productivity  than  on its  own.
8.  This  adjustment  mechanism  in  urban  labor  markets  has  been extensively
studied  since  1979  when the  first  paper  by Sanchez,  Ferrero  & Schulthess
was published. See  for  example Beccaria  (1980),  Beccaria  &  Orsatti
(1985),  Mann  & Sanchez  (1984),  Dieguez  &  Gerchunoff  (1984),  Llach
(1980),  Sanchez  (1982),  SAnchez  (1987)  and  Riveros  (1989).
9.  Open  unemployment  is defined  as the  ratio  of those  identified  as
unemployed  in the  Permanent  Household  Survey  (PHS)  to the  economically
active  population.  Underemployed  are  those  working  less  than  35  hours
per  week  and seeking  for  more  hours  of  work.  If the  convention  is
accepted  that  two  underemployed  are  equivalent  to  one  unemployed,  and
these  'converted'  unemployed  are  added  to open  unemployed,  "equivalent
unemployment  rate"  can  be calculated.45
10.  Analysis  of figures  for  Greater  Buenos  Aires  reveals  that  from  October
1983  to October  1988,  the  overall  labor  force  participation  increased
more than  7  percent  and  that,  when  the  statistics  are  disaggregated  by
age  and  sex,  they  show  a substantial  increase  in  female  participation,
especially  in  the  35-49  year  age  group. Increases  in  male labor  force
participation  were small,  with the  exception  of relatively  younger
groups. Thus,  this  reveals  a  vital  change  in  the  participation  of
secondary  labor  force.  (see  Riveros  (1989)).
11.  For  a detailed  analysis  of this  mechanism  of labor  absorption  in the
provinces,  refer  to Sanchez  (1986)  and  Lindenboim  (1985).
12.  The  conclusions  obtained  cannot  be extended  to the  rest  of the  country
unless  it is  assumed  that  these  two  cities  are  representative  of the
overall  situation. However,  given  the  large  concentration  of population
in the  urban  areas,  and  the  large  share  of these  cities  in the  urban
total  as  was discussed  in section  III.2.1. this  seems  an acceptable
assumption.46
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